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Abstract
Distributed storage plays a crucial role in the current cloud computing framework. After the theoretical
bound for distributed storage was derived by the pioneer work of the regenerating code, Reed-Solomon
code based regenerating codes were developed. The RS code based minimum storage regeneration code
(RS-MSR) and the minimum bandwidth regeneration code (RS-MBR) can achieve theoretical bounds
on the MSR point and the MBR point respectively in code regeneration. They can also maintain the
MDS property in code reconstruction. However, in the hostile network where the storage nodes can
be compromised and the packets can be tampered with, the storage capacity of the network can be
significantly affected. In this paper, we propose a Hermitian code based minimum storage regenerating (H-
MSR) code and a minimum bandwidth regenerating (H-MBR) code. We first prove that our proposed
Hermitian code based regenerating codes can achieve the theoretical bounds for MSR point and MBR
point respectively. We then propose data regeneration and reconstruction algorithms for the H-MSR code
and the H-MBR code in both error-free network and hostile network. Theoretical evaluation shows that
our proposed schemes can detect the erroneous decodings and correct more errors in hostile network than
the RS-MSR code and the RS-MBR code with the same code rate. Our analysis also demonstrates that the
proposed H-MSR and H-MBR codes have lower computational complexity than the RS-MSR/RS-MBR
codes in both code regeneration and code reconstruction.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage is an on-demand network data storage and access paradigm. To ensure accessibility of
remotely stored data at any time, a typical solution is to store data across multiple servers or clouds,
often in a replicated fashion. Data replication not only lacks flexibility in data recovery, but also requires
secure data management and protection.
It is well known that secure data management is generally very costly and may be vulnerable to data
compromising attacks. Distributed data storage provides an elegant tradeoff between the costly secure
data management task and the cheap storage media. The main idea for distributed storage is that instead of
storing the entire data in one server, we can split the data into n data components and store the components
across multiple servers. The original data can be recovered only when the required (threshold) number
of components, say k, are collected. In fact, the original data is information theoretically secure for
anyone who has access up to k − 1 data components. In this case, when the individual components
are stored distributively across multiple cloud storage servers, each cloud storage server only needs to
ensure data integrity and data availability. The costly data encryption and secure key management may
no longer be needed any more. The distributed cloud storage can also increase data availability while
reducing network congestion that leads to increased resiliency. A popular approach is to employ an (n, k)
maximum distance separable (MDS) code such as an Reed-Solomon (RS) code [1], [2]. For RS code,
the data is stored in n storage nodes in the network. The data collector (DC) can reconstruct the data by
connecting to any k healthy nodes.
While RS code works perfect in reconstructing the data, it lacks scalability in repairing or regenerating
a failed node. To deal with this issue, the concept of regenerating code was introduced in [3]. The main
idea of the regenerating code is to allow a replacement node to connect to some individual nodes directly
and regenerate a substitute of the failed node, instead of first recovering the original data then regenerating
the failed component.
Compared to the RS code, regenerating code achieves an optimal tradeoff between bandwidth and
storage within the minimum storage regeneration (MSR) and the minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR)
points. RS code based MSR (RS-MSR) code and MBR (RS-MBR) code have been explicitly constructed
in [4]. However, the existing research either has no error detection capability, or has the error correction
capability limited by the RS code. Moreover, the schemes with error correction capability are unable to
determine whether the error correction is successful.
In this paper, we construct the regenerating codes by combining the Hermitian code and regenerating
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3code at the MSR point (H-MSR code) and the MBR point (H-MBR code). We prove that these codes
can achieve the theoretical MSR bound and MBR bound respectively. We also propose data regeneration
and reconstruction algorithms for the H-MSR code and the H-MBR code in both error-free network and
hostile network. Our proposed algorithms can detect the errors in the network while achieving the error
correction capability beyond the RS code. Moreover, our proposed algorithms can determine whether the
error correction is successful.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, related work is reviewed. The preliminary
of this paper is presented in Section III. In Section IV, our proposed encoding of H-MSR code is
described. In Section V, regeneration of the H-MSR code is discussed. Reconstruction of the H-MSR
code is analyzed in Section VI. In Section VII, our proposed encoding of H-MBR code is described.
In Section VIII, regeneration of the H-MBR code is discussed. Reconstruction of the H-MBR code is
analyzed in Section IX. We conduct performance analysis in Section X. The paper is concluded in Section
XI.
II. RELATED WORK
When a storage node in the distributed storage network that employing the conventional (n, k) RS
code (such as OceanStore [1] and Total Recall [2]) fails, the replacement node connects to k nodes and
downloads the whole file to recover the symbols stored in the failed node. This approach is a waste
of bandwidth because the whole file has to be downloaded to recover a fraction of it. To overcome
this drawback, Dimakis et al. [3] introduced the concept of {n, k, d, α, β,B} regenerating code. In the
context of regenerating code, the replacement node can regenerate the contents stored in a failed node
by downloading γ help symbols from d helper nodes. The bandwidth consumption to regenerate a failed
node could be far less than the whole file. A data collector (DC) can reconstruct the original file stored in
the network by downloading α symbols from each of the k storage nodes. In [3], the authors proved that
there is a tradeoff between bandwidth γ and per node storage α. They find two optimal points: minimum
storage regeneration (MSR) and minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) points.
The regenerating code can be divided into functional regeneration and exact regeneration. In the
functional regeneration, the replacement node regenerates a new component that can functionally replace
the failed component instead of being the same as the original stored component. [5] formulated the
data regeneration as a multicast network coding problem and constructed functional regenerating codes.
[6] implemented a random linear regenerating codes for distributed storage systems. [7] proved that by
allowing data exchange among the replacement nodes, a better tradeoff between repair bandwidth γ and
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4per node storage α can be achieved. In the exact regeneration, the replacement node regenerates the exact
symbols of a failed node. [8] proposed to reduce the regeneration bandwidth through algebraic alignment.
[9] provided a code structure for exact regeneration using interference alignment technique. [4] presented
optimal exact constructions of MBR codes and MSR codes under product-matrix framework. This is the
first work that allows independent selection of the nodes number n in the network.
However, none of the existing work above considered code regeneration under node corruption or
adversarial manipulation attacks. In fact, all these schemes will fail in both regeneration and reconstruction
in these scenarios.
In [10], the authors discussed the amount of information that can be safely stored against passive
eavesdropping and active adversarial attacks based on the regeneration structure. In [11], the authors
proposed to add CRC codes in the regenerating code to check the integrity of the data in hostile network.
Unfortunately, the CRC checks can also be manipulated by the malicious nodes, resulting in the failure
of the regeneration and reconstruction. In [12], the authors analyzed the error resilience of the RS code
based regenerating code in the network with errors and erasures. They provided the theoretical error
correction capability. Their result is an extension of the MDS code to the regenerating code and their
scheme is unable to determine whether the errors in the network are successfully corrected.
In this paper, we propose a Hermitian code based minimum storage regeneration (H-MSR) code and a
Hermitian code based minimum bandwidth regeneration (H-MBR) code. The proposed H-MSR/H-MBR
codes can correct more errors than the RS-MSR/RS-MBR codes and can always determine whether the
error correction is successful. Our design is based on the structural analysis of the Hermitian code and
the efficient decoding algorithm proposed in [13].
It is worthwhile to point out that although there are strong connections between regenerating code
in distributed storage and general network communication of which security problems have been well
studied, our proposed H-MSR/H-MBR codes are fundamentally different from these security studies
of network communication e.g. [14]–[17], for two main reasons. First, the significant error correction
capability of the proposed H-MSR/H-MBR codes is due to the underlying Hermitian code [13], instead
of relying on an error-detection layer, and/or shared secret keys between the sender and the receiver for
error detection [14, Section 8.6.1]. Second, the regenerating codes studied in this paper and the general
network communication are different in that besides the overall data reconstruction, the regenerating
codes also emphasize repairing of the corrupted code components (regeneration), while general network
communication only focuses on data reproducing (reconstruction). Therefore, both the principle and the
scope of this paper are different from the researches of security in general network communication.
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5III. PRELIMINARY AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Regenerating Code
Regenerating code introduced in [3] is a linear code over the finite field Fq with a set of parameters
{n, k, d, α, β,B}. A file of size B is stored in n storage nodes, each of which stores α symbols. A
replacement node can regenerate the contents of a failed node by downloading β symbols from each of
d randomly selected storage nodes. So the total bandwidth needed to regenerate a failed node is γ = dβ.
The data collector (DC) can reconstruct the whole file by downloading α symbols from each of k ≤ d
randomly selected storage nodes. In [3], the following theoretical bound was derived:
B ≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{α, (d − i)β}. (1)
From equation (1), a tradeoff between the regeneration bandwidth γ and the storage requirement α was
derived. There are two special cases: minimum storage regeneration (MSR) point in which the storage
parameter α is minimized;
(αMSR, γMSR) =
(
B
k
,
Bd
k(d− k + 1)
)
, (2)
and minimum bandwidth regeneration (MBR) point in which the bandwidth γ is minimized:
(αMBR, γMBR) =
(
2Bd
2kd − k2 + k
,
2Bd
2kd− k2 + k
)
. (3)
In this paper, we assume that DC keeps the encoding matrix secret and each storage node only knows
its own encoding vector.
B. Hermitian Code
A Hermitian curve H(q) over Fq2 in affine coordinates is defined by:
H(q) : yq + y = xq+1. (4)
The genus of H(q) is ̺ = (q2 − q)/2 and there are q3 points that satisfy equation (4), denoted as
P0,0, · · · , P0,q−1, · · · , Pq2−1,0, · · · , Pq2−1,q−1 (See Table I), where θ0, θ1, · · · , θq−1 are the q solutions to
yq + y = 0 and φ is a primitive element in Fq2 . L(mQ) is defined as:
L(mQ) = {f0(x) + yf1(x) + · · ·+ y
q−1fq−1(x)|
deg fj(x) < κ(j), j = 0, 1, · · · , q − 1}, (5)
where
κ(j) = max{t|tq + j(q + 1) ≤ m}+ 1, (6)
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6for m ≥ q2 − 1. A codeword of the Hermitian code [13] Hm is defined as
(̺(P0,0), · · · , ̺(P0,q−1), · · · , ̺(Pq2−1,0), · · · , ̺(Pq2−1,q−1)), (7)
where ̺ ∈ L(mQ). The dimension of the message before encoding can be calculated as dim(Hm) =∑j=q−1
j=0 (deg fj(x) + 1).
TABLE I
q3 RATIONAL POINTS OF THE HERMITIAN CURVE
P0,0 = (0, θ0) P1,0 = (1, φ+ θ0) · · · Pq2−1,0 = (φ
q
2
−2, φ(q
2
−2)(q+1)+1) + θ0
P0,1 = (0, θ1) P1,1 = (1, φ+ θ1) · · · Pq2−1,1 = (φ
q
2
−2, φ(q
2
−2)(q+1)+1) + θ1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
P0,q−1 = (0, θq−1) P1,q−1 = (1, φ+ θq−1) · · · Pq2−1,q−1 = (φ
q
2
−2, φ(q
2
−2)(q+1)+1) + θq−1
C. Adversarial Model
In this paper, we assume some network nodes may be corrupted due to hardware failure or commu-
nication errors, and/or be compromised by malicious users. As a result, upon request, these nodes may
send out incorrect responses to disrupt the data regeneration and reconstruction. The adversary model is
the same as [12], We assume that the malicious users can take full control of τ (τ ≤ n and corresponds
to s in [12]) storage nodes and collude to perform attacks.
We will refer these symbols as bogus symbols without making distinction between the corrupted
symbols and compromised symbols. We will also use corrupted nodes, malicious nodes and compromised
nodes interchangeably without making any distinction.
IV. ENCODING H-MSR CODE
In this section, we will analyze the H-MSR code based on the MSR point with d = 2k − 2 = 2α.
The code based on the MSR point with d > 2k − 2 can be derived the same way through truncating
operations.
Let α0, · · · , αq−1 be a strictly decreasing integer sequence satisfying 0 < αi ≤ κ(i), 0 ≤ i ≤ q −
1, where αi is the parameter α for the underlying regenerating code. The least common multiple of
α0, · · · , αq−1 is A. Suppose the data contains B = A
∑q−1
i=0 (αi + 1) message symbols from the finite
field Fq2 . In practice, if the size of the actual data is larger than B symbols, we can fragment it into
blocks of size B and process each block individually.
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7We arrange the B symbols into two matrices S, T as below:
S =

S0
S1
.
.
.
Sq−1
 , T =

T0
T1
.
.
.
Tq−1
 , (8)
where
Si = [Si,1, Si,2, · · · , Si,A/αi ],
Ti = [Ti,1, Ti,2, · · · , Ti,A/αi ]. (9)
Si,j, 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, is a symmetric matrix of size αi × αi with the upper-triangular
entries filled by data symbols. Thus Si,j contains αi(αi+1)/2 symbols. The number of columns of each
submatrix Si, 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, is the same: αi ·A/αi = A. The size of matrix S is (
∑q−1
i=0 αi)×A. So it
contains
∑q−1
i=0 (αi(αi + 1)/2)A/αi = (A
∑q−1
i=0 (αi + 1))/2 data symbols.
Ti,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, is constructed the same as Si,j . So T contains the other
(A
∑q−1
i=0 (αi + 1))/2 data symbols.
Definition 1. For a Hermitian code Hm over Fq2 , we encode matrix Mdim(Hm)×A = [M1,M2 · · · ,MA]
by encoding each column Mi, i = 1, 2, · · · , A, individually using Hm. The codeword matrix is defined
as
Hm(M) = [Hm(M1),Hm(M2), · · · ,Hm(MA)], (10)
where Hm(Mi) has the following form (̺ ∈ L(mQ)):
[̺(P0,0), · · · , ̺(P0,q−1), · · · , ̺(Pq2−1,0), · · · , ̺(Pq2−1,q−1)]
T , (11)
and the elements of Mi are viewed as the coefficients of the polynomials f0(x), · · · , fq−1(x) in ̺ when
Mi is encoded.
Let
Φi =

1 0 0 · · · 0
1 1 1 · · · 1
1 φ φ2 · · · φαi−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 φq
2−2 (φq
2−2)2 · · · (φq
2−2)αi−1

(12)
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8be a Vandermonde matrix, where φ is the primitive element in Fq2 mentioned in section III-B and
0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1.
Define
∆ =

λ0 0 · · · 0
0 λ1 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · λq2−1
 (13)
to be a diagonal matrix comprised of q2 elements, where λi, 0 ≤ i ≤ q2−1, is chosen using the following
two criteria: (i) λi 6= λj, ∀i 6= j, 0 ≤ i, j ≤ q2 − 1. (ii) Any di = 2αi rows of the matrix [Φi,∆ · Φi],
0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, are linearly independent.
We also define
Λi = λiI (14)
to be a q × q diagonal matrix for 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1, where I is the q × q identical matrix. And
Γ =

Λ0 0 · · · 0
0 Λ1 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · Λq2−1
 (15)
is a q3 × q3 diagonal matrix formed by q2 diagonal submatrices Λ0, · · · ,Λq2−1.
For distributed storage, we encode each pair of matrices (S, T ) using Algorithm 1. We will name this
encoding scheme as Hermitian-MSR code encoding, or H-MSR code encoding.
Algorithm 1. Encoding H-MSR Code
Step 1: Encode the data matrices S, T defined in equation (8) using a Hermitian code Hm over Fq2 with
parameters κ(j) (0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1) and m (m ≥ q2 − 1). Denote the generated q3 ×A codeword
matrices as Hm(S) and Hm(T ).
Step 2: Compute the q3 ×A codeword matrix Y = Hm(S) + ΓHm(T ).
Step 3: Divide Y into q2 submatrices Y0, · · · , Yq2−1 of size q×A and store each submatrix in a storage
node as shown in Fig. 1.
For H-MSR coding encoding, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The H-MSR code encoding described in Algorithm 1 can achieve the MSR point in distributed
storage.
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9Storage 
Node 0
Storage 
Node 1
Storage 
Node q2-1
...
Y =
Y0
Y1
Yq -12
...
Fig. 1. Illustration of storing the codeword matrices in distributed storage nodes
Proof: We first study the structure of the codeword matrix Hm(S). Since every column of the matrix
is an independent Hermitian codeword, we can decode the first column h = [h0,0, · · · , h0,q−1, · · · , hq2−1,0,
· · · , hq2−1,q−1]
T as an example without loss of generality. We arrange the q3 rational points of the
Hermitian curve following the order in Table I. In the table, we can find that for each i, i = 0, 1, · · · , q2−1,
the rational points Pi,0, Pi,1, · · · , Pi,q−1 all have the same first coordinate.
Suppose ̺ ∈ L(mQ): ̺(Pi,l) = f0(Pi,l)+y(Pi,l)f1(Pi,l)+ · · ·+(y(Pi,l))q−1fq−1(Pi,l), 0 ≤ i ≤ q2−1,
0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1,deg fj(x) = αj − 1 for 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1. Since Pi,0, Pi,1, · · · , Pi,q−1 all have the same first
coordinate and fj(Pi,l) is only applied to the first coordinate of Pi,l, we have fj(Pi,l) = fj(φsi), s0 =
−∞, si = i − 1, for i ≥ 1, φ−∞ = 0, which does not depend on l. Therefore, we can derive q2 sets of
equations for 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1:
f0(φ
si) + y(Pi,0)f1(φ
si) + · · ·+ (y(Pi,0))
q−1fq−1(φ
si) = hi,0
f0(φ
si) + y(Pi,1)f1(φ
si) + · · ·+ (y(Pi,1))
q−1fq−1(φ
si) = hi,1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
f0(φ
si) + y(Pi,q−1)f1(φ
si) + · · · + (y(Pi,q−1))
q−1fq−1(φ
si) = hi,q−1
. (16)
If we store the codeword matrix in storage nodes according to Fig. 1, each set of the equations corresponds
to a storage node. As we mentioned above, the set of equations in equation (16) can be derived in storage
node i.
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Since the coefficient matrix Bi is a Vandermonde matrix:
Bi =

1 y(Pi,0) · · · y(Pi,0)
q−1
1 y(Pi,1) · · · y(Pi,1)
q−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 y(Pi,q−1) · · · y(Pi,q−1)
q−1
 . (17)
we can solve ui = [f0(φsi), f1(φsi), · · · , fq−1(φsi)]T from
ui = B
−1
i hi, (18)
where hi = [hi,0, hi,1, · · · , hi,q−1]T .
From all the q2 storage nodes, we can get vectors Fi = [fi(0), fi(1), · · · , fi(φq
2−2)]T , i = 0, · · · , q−1,
which can be viewed as extended Reed-Solomon codes.
Now consider all the columns of Hm(S), we can get the following equation:
ΦiSi,j = Fi,j, (19)
where Fi,j = [F (1)i , · · · ,F
(αi)
i ], 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, and F
(l)
i corresponds to the lth column
of the submatrix Si,j .
Next we will consider the structure of the codeword matrix Hm(T ). Because the encoding process for
Hm(T ) is the same as that of Hm(S), for ΓHm(T ), we can derive
∆ΦiTi,j = ∆Ei,j, (20)
where Ei = [ei(0), ei(1), · · · , ei(φq
2−2)]T , Ei,j = [E
(1)
i , · · · , E
(αi)
i ], 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, and
E
(l)
i corresponds to the lth column of the submatrix Ti,j .
Thirdly, we will study the optimality of the code in the sense of the MSR point. For ΦiSi,j +
∆ΦiTi,j, 0 ≤ i ≤ q−1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, since Si,j, Ti,j are symmetric and satisfy the requirements for MSR
point according to [4] with parameters d = 2αi, k = αi+1, α = αi, β = 1, B = αi ·(αi+1). By encoding
S, T using Hm(S)+ΓHm(T ) and distributing Y0, · · · , Yq2−1 into q2 storage nodes, each row of the matrix
ΦiSi,j+∆ΦiTi,j, 0 ≤ i ≤ q−1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, can be derived in a corresponding storage node. Because
ΦiSi,j+∆ΦiTi,j achieves the MSR point, data related to matrices Si,j, Ti,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ q−1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi,
can be regenerated at the MSR point. Therefore, Algorithm 1 can achieve the MSR point.
V. REGENERATION OF THE H-MSR CODE
In this section, we will first discuss regeneration of the H-MSR code in error-free network. Then we
will discuss regeneration in hostile network.
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A. Regeneration in Error-free Network
Let vi = [e0(φ(si)), e1(φ(si)), · · · , eq−1(φ(si))]T , then
ui + Λivi = B
−1
i yi = [f0(φ
si) + λie0(φ
si), · · · , fq−1(φ
si) + λieq−1(φ
si)]T , (21)
for every column yi of Yi.
The main idea of the regeneration algorithms is to regenerate fl(φsi) + λiel(φsi), 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1, by
downloading help symbols from dl = 2αl nodes, where dl represents the regeneration parameter d for
fl(φ
si) + λiel(φ
si) in the H-MSR code regeneration.
Suppose node z fails, we devise Algorithm 2 in the network to regenerate the exact H-MSR code
symbols of node z in a replacement node z′. For convenience, we suppose dq = 2αq = 0 and define
Vi,j,l =

νi,l
νi+1,l
.
.
.
νj,l
 , (22)
where νt,l, i ≤ t ≤ j, is the tth row of [Φl,∆Φl]. Each node i, 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1, only stores its own
encoding vector νi,l, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1.
First, replacement node z′ will send requests to helper nodes for regeneration: z′ sends the integer
j to dj − dj+1 helper nodes, to which z′ has not sent requests before, for every j from q − 1 to 0 in
descending order.
Upon receiving the request integer j, helper node i will calculate and send the help symbols as follows:
node i will first calculate Y˜i = B−1i Yi to remove the coefficient matrix Bi from the codeword matrix.
Since the (l+1)th row of Y˜i corresponds to the symbols related to fl(φsi)+λiel(φsi), for 0 ≤ l ≤ j, node
i will divide the (l+1)th row of Y˜i into A/αl row vectors of the size 1×αl: [y˜i,l,1, y˜i,l,2, · · · , y˜i,l,A/αl ].
Then for every 0 ≤ l ≤ j and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, node i will calculate the help symbol p˜i,l,t = y˜i,l,tµTz,l,
where µz,l is the zth row of the encoding matrix Φl defined in equation (12). At last, node i will send
out all the calculated symbols p˜i,l,t. Here j indicates that z′ is requesting symbols p˜i,l,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ j and
1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, calculated by [f0(φsi) + λie0(φsi), · · · , fj(φsi) + λiej(φsi)]T
Since dl1 > dl2 for l1 < l2, for efficiency consideration, only dq−1 helper nodes need to send out
symbols p˜i,l,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, calculated by [f0(φsi) + λie0(φsi), f1(φsi) +
λie1(φ
si), · · · , fq−1(φ
si)+λieq−1(φ
si)]T . Then dj−dj+1 nodes only need to send out symbols p˜i,l,t, 0 ≤
l ≤ j and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, calculated by [f0(φsi)+λie0(φsi), f1(φsi)+λie1(φsi), · · · , fj(φsi)+λiej(φsi)]T
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for 0 ≤ j ≤ q−2. In this way, the total number of helper nodes that send out symbols p˜i,l,t, 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl,
calculated by fl(φsi) + λiel(φsi) is dq−1 +
∑q−2
j=l (dj − dj+1) = dl.
When the replacement node z′ receives all the requested symbols, it can regenerate the symbols stored
in the failed node z using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 2. z′ regenerates symbols of the failed node z
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, calculate the regenerated symbols related to the
help symbols p˜i,l,t from dl helper nodes. Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ dl − 1:
Step 1.1: Let p = [p˜0,l,t, p˜1,l,t, · · · , p˜dl−1,l,t]T , solve the equation: V0,dl−1,lx = p.
Step 1.2: Since x =
Sl,t
Tl,t
µTz,l and Sl,t, Tl,t are symmetric, we can calculate xT = [µz,lSl,t, µz,lTl,t].
Step 1.3: Compute y˜z,l,t = µz,lSl,t + λzµz,lTl,t = νz,l
Sl,t
Tl,t

.
Step 2: Let Y˜z be a q ×A matrix with the lth row defined as [y˜z,l,1, · · · , y˜z,l,A/αl ], 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1.
Step 3: Calculate the regenerated symbols of the failed node z: Yz′ = Yz = BzY˜z.
From Algorithm 2, we can derive the equivalent storage parameters for each symbol block of size
Bj = A(αj + 1): d = 2αj , k = αj + 1, α = A, β = A/αj , 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1 and equation (2) of the MSR
point holds for these parameters. Theorem 1 guarantees that Algorithm 2 can achieve the MSR point for
data regeneration of the H-MSR code.
B. Regeneration in Hostile Network
In hostile network, Algorithm 2 may not be able to regenerate the failed node due to possible bogus
symbols received from the responses. In fact, even if the replacement node z′ can derive the symbol
matrix Yz′ using Algorithm 2, it cannot verify the correctness of the result.
There are two modes for the helper nodes to regenerate the contents of a failed storage node in hostile
network. One mode is the detection mode, in which no error has been found in the symbols received
from the helper nodes. Once errors are detected, the recovery mode will be used to correct the errors
and locate the malicious nodes.
1) Detection Mode: In the detection mode, the replacement node z′ will send requests in the way
similar to that of the error-free network in Section V-A. The only difference is that when j = q − 1,
z′ sends requests to dq−1 − dq + 1 nodes instead of dq−1 − dq nodes. Helper nodes will still use the
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way similar to that of the error-free network in Section V-A to send the help symbols. The regeneration
algorithm is described in Algorithm 3 with the detection probability characterized in Theorem 2.
Algorithm 3 (Detection mode). z′ regenerates symbols of the failed node z in hostile network
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q− 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, we can calculate the regenerated symbols which are
related to the help symbols p˜′i,l,t from dl helper nodes. p˜′i,l,t = p˜i,l,t + ei,l,t is the response from
the ith helper node. If p˜i,l,t has been modified by the malicious node i, we have ei,l,t ∈ Fq2\{0}.
Otherwise we have ei,l,t = 0. To detect whether there are errors, we will calculate symbols
from two sets of helper nodes then compare the results. (Without loss of generality, we assume
0 ≤ i ≤ dl.)
Step 1.1: Let p1′ = [p˜′0,l,t, p˜′1,l,t, · · · , p˜′dl−1,l,t]
T
, where the symbols are collected from node 0
to node dl − 1, solve the equation V0,dl−1,lx1 = p1′.
Step 1.2: Let p2′ = [p˜′1,l,t, p˜′2,l,t, · · · , p˜′dl,l,t]
T
, where the symbols are collected from node 1 to
node dl, solve the equation V1,dl,lx2 = p2′.
Step 1.3: Compare x1 with x2. If they are the same, compute y˜z,l,t = µz,lSl,t + λzµz,lTl,t as
described in Algorithm 2. Otherwise, errors are detected in the help symbols. Exit the algorithm
and switch to recovery regeneration mode.
Step 2: No error has been detected for the calculating of the regeneration so far. Let Y˜z be a q × A
matrix with the lth row defined as [y˜z,l,1, · · · , y˜z,l,A/αl ], 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1.
Step 3: Calculate the regenerated symbols of the failed node z: Yz′ = Yz = BzY˜z.
Lemma 1. Suppose e0, · · · , edl are the dl + 1 errors e0,l,t, · · · , edl,l,t in Algorithm 3, xˆ1 = V−10,dl−1,l ·
[e0, · · · , edl−1]
T and xˆ2 = V−11,dl,l · [e1, · · · , edl ]
T
. When the number of malicious nodes in the dl + 1
helper nodes is less than dl + 1, the probability that xˆ1 = xˆ2 is at most 1/q2.
Proof: Since V0,dl−1,l and V1,dl,l are full rank matrices, we can get their corresponding inverse
matrices. xˆ1 = xˆ2 is equivalent to V0,dl−1,l · xˆ1 = V0,dl−1,l · xˆ2.
First, we have
V0,dl−1,l · xˆ1 = [e0, e1, · · · , edl−1]
T . (23)
Suppose V−11,dl,l = [η0, η1, · · · , ηdl−1], then we have:
νr,l · ηs =
1, r = s+ 10, r 6= s+ 1 , 1 ≤ r ≤ dl, 0 ≤ s ≤ dl − 1. (24)
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V0,dl−1,l · xˆ2 = V0,dl−1,l ·V
−1
1,dl,l
· [e1, e2, · · · , edl ]
T
= V0,dl−1,l · [η0, η1, · · · , ηdl−1] · [e1, e2, · · · , edl ]
T (25)
= [x2,0, e1, · · · , edl−1]
T .
To calculate x2,0, we first derive the expression of ν0,l. Because ν1,l, ν2,l, · · · , νdl,l are linearly inde-
pendent, they can be viewed as a set of bases of the dl dimensional linear space. So we have
ν0,l =
r=dl∑
r=1
ζr · νr,l, (26)
where ζr 6= 0, r = 1, · · · , dl, because any dl vectors out of ν0,l, ν1,l, · · · , νdl,l are linearly independent.
Then
x2,0 =
(
r=dl∑
r=1
ζr · νr,l
)
[η0, η1, · · · , ηdl−1][e1, e2, · · · , edl ]
T
=
r=dl∑
r=1
ζr · er. (27)
If
e0 =
r=dl∑
r=1
ζr · er, (28)
then V0,dl−1,l · xˆ1 = V0,dl−1,l · xˆ2 and xˆ1 = xˆ2.
The number of errors corresponds to the number of malicious nodes. When only one element of
e0, e1, · · · , edl is nonzero, since ζ1, · · · , ζdl are all nonzero, equation (28) will never hold. In this case,
the probability is 0. When there are more than one nonzero elements, it means there are more than one
malicious nodes. If the number of malicious nodes is less than dl + 1, they will not be able to collude
to solve the coefficients ζr in (26). The probability that equation (28) holds will be 1/q2.
Theorem 2 (H-MSR Regeneration–Detection Mode). When the number of malicious nodes in the dl+1
helper nodes of Algorithm 3 is less than dl + 1, the probability for the bogus symbols sent from the
malicious nodes to be detected is at least 1− 1/q2.
Proof: Since V0,dl−1,l and V1,dl,l are full rank matrices, x1 can be calculated by (For convenience,
use ei to represent ei,l,t):
x1 = V
−1
0,dl−1,l
·
[
p˜0,l,t + e0, · · · , p˜dl−1,l,t + edl−1
]T
= x+V−10,dl−1,l · [e0, e1, · · · , edl−1]
T
= x+ xˆ1. (29)
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x2 can be calculated the same way:
x2 = x+V
−1
1,dl,l
· [e1, e2, · · · , edl ]
T = x+ xˆ2. (30)
If xˆ1 = xˆ2, Algorithm 3 will fail to detect the errors. So we will focus on the relationship between xˆ1
and xˆ2. According to Lemma 1, when the number of malicious nodes in the dl + 1 helper nodes is less
than dl + 1, the probability that xˆ1 = xˆ2 is at most 1/q2. So the probability that x1 6= x2, equivalently
the detection probability, is at least 1− 1/q2.
2) Recovery Mode: Once the replacement node z′ detects errors using Algorithm 3, it will send integer
j = q− 1 to all the other q2 − 1 nodes in the network requesting help symbols. Helper node i will send
help symbols similar to Section V-A. z′ can regenerate symbols using Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 (Recovery mode). z′ regenerates symbols of the failed node z in hostile network
Step 1: For every q − 1 ≥ l ≥ 0 in descending order and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl in ascending order, we can
regenerate the symbols when the errors in the received help symbols p˜′i,l,t from q2 − 1 helper
nodes can be corrected. Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 2.
Step 1.1: Let p′ = [p˜′0,l,t, p˜′1,l,t, · · · , p˜′q2−2,l,t]T . Since V0,q2−2,l ·x = p′, p′ can be viewed as an
MDS code with parameters (q2 − 1, dl, q2 − dl).
Step 1.2: Substitute p˜′i,l,t in p′ with the symbol ⊗ representing an erasure if node i has been
detected to be corrupted in the previous loops (previous values of l, t).
Step 1.3: If the number of erasures in p′ is larger than min{q2 − dl − 1, ⌊(q2 − dq−1 − 1)/2⌋},
then the number of errors have exceeded the error correction capability. So here we will flag the
decoding failure and exit the algorithm.
Step 1.4: Since the number of errors is within the error correction capability of the MDS code,
decode p′ to p′cw and solve x.
Step 1.5: If the ith position symbols of p′cw and p′ are different, mark node i as corrupted.
Step 1.6: Compute y˜z,l,t = µz,l · Sl,t + λz · µz,l · Tl,t as described in Algorithm 2.
Step 2: Let Y˜z be a q ×A matrix with the lth row defined as [y˜z,l,1, · · · , y˜z,l,A/αl ], 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1.
Step 3: Calculate the regenerated symbols of the failed node z: Yz′ = Yz = BzY˜z.
For data regeneration described in Algorithm 4, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 3 (H-MSR Regeneration–Recovery Mode). For data regeneration, the number of errors that
the H-MSR code can correct is
τH−MSR = q · ⌊(q
2 − dq−1 − 1)/2⌋. (31)
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Proof: H-MSR code can be viewed as q MDS codes with parameters (q2 − 1, dl, q2 − dl), l =
0, · · · , q − 1. Since αl ≤ κ(l) and κ(l) is strictly decreasing, we can choose the sequence αl to be
strictly decreasing. So dl is also strictly decreasing. For the q MDS codes, the minimum distance of
the (q2 − 1, dq−1, q2 − dq−1) code is the largest. In Algorithm 4, this code is decoded first and it can
correct up to τq−1 =
⌊
(q2 − dq−1 − 1)/2
⌋
errors, where ⌊x⌋ is the floor function of x. Then the code
(q2 − 1, dl, q
2 − dl), l = q − 2, · · · , 0, will be decoded sequentially. The (q2 − 1, dl, q2 − dl) code can
correct at most τl = τq−1 errors when q2−d0−1 ≥ τq−1. Thus, the total numbers errors that the H-MSR
code can correct is τH−MSR = q · τq−1 = q · ⌊(q2 − dq−1 − 1)/2⌋.
VI. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE H-MSR CODE
In this section, we will first discuss reconstruction of the H-MSR code in error-free network. Then we
will discuss reconstruction of the H-MSR code when there are corrupted nodes in the network.
A. Reconstruction in Error-free Network
The main idea of the reconstruction algorithms is to reconstruct fl(φsi) + λiel(φsi), 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1,
by downloading help symbols from kl = αl + 1 nodes, where kl is used to represent the reconstruction
parameter k for fl(φsi) + λiel(φsi) in the H-MSR code reconstruction. We devise Algorithm 5 in the
network for the data collector DC to reconstruct the original file. For convenience, we suppose αq = 0.
First, DC will send requests to the storage nodes for reconstruction: DC sends integer j to kj − kj+1
helper nodes, to which DC has not sent requests before, for every j from q− 1 to 0 in descending order.
Upon receiving the request integer j, node i will calculate and send symbols as follows: first node
i will calculate Y˜i = B−1i Yi to remove the coefficient matrix Bi from the codeword matrix. Since the
(l+ 1)th row of Y˜i corresponds to the symbols related to fl(φsi) + λiel(φsi), for 0 ≤ l ≤ j, node i will
send out the (l+1)th row of Y˜i: y˜i,l. Here j indicates that DC is requesting symbols of y˜i,l, 0 ≤ l ≤ j,
calculated by [f0(φsi) + λie0(φsi), · · · , fj(φsi) + λiej(φsi)]T .
Since kl1 > kl2 for l1 < l2, for efficiency consideration, only kq−1 helper nodes need to send out
symbols of y˜i,l, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1, calculated by [f0(φsi) + λie0(φsi), f1(φsi) + λie1(φsi), · · · , fq−1(φsi) +
λieq−1(φ
si)]T . Then kj − kj+1 nodes only need to send out symbols of y˜i,l, 0 ≤ l ≤ j, calculated by
[f0(φ
si) + λie0(φ
si), f1(φ
si) + λie1(φ
si), · · · , fj(φ
si) + λiej(φ
si)]T for 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 2. In this way,
the total number of helper nodes that send out symbols of y˜i,l calculated by fl(φsi) + λiel(φsi) is
kq−1 +
∑q−2
j=l (kj − kj+1) = kl.
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When DC receives all the requested symbols, it can reconstruct the original file using the following
algorithm:
Algorithm 5. DC reconstructs the original file
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 , divide the response symbol vector y˜i,l from the ith node into A/αl
equal row vectors: [y˜i,l,1, y˜i,l,2, · · · , y˜i,l,A/αl ], 0 ≤ i ≤ kl − 1.
Step 2: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q− 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, DC reconstructs the matrices related to the original
file:
Step 2.1: Let R = [y˜T0,l,t, y˜T1,l,t, · · · , y˜Tkl−1,l,t]
T
, we have the equation: V0,kl−1,l ·
Sl,t
Tl,t
 = R
according to the encoding algorithm.
Step 2.2: DC reconstructs Sl,t, Tl,t using techniques similar to [4].
Step 3: DC reconstructs the original file from all the matrices Sl,t, Tl,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ q−1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl.
B. Reconstruction in Hostile Network
Similar to the regeneration algorithms, the reconstruction algorithms in error-free network do not work
in hostile network. Even if the data collecter can calculate the symbol matrices S, T using Algorithm 5,
it cannot verify whether the result is correct or not. There are two modes for the original file to be
reconstructed in hostile network. One mode is the detection mode, in which no error has been found
in the symbols received from the storage nodes. Once errors are detected in the detection mode, the
recovery mode will be used to correct the errors and locate the malicious nodes.
1) Detection Mode: In the detection mode, DC will send requests in the way similar to that for the
error-free network in Section VI-A. The only difference is that when j = q − 1, DC will send requests
to kq−1 − kq + 1 nodes instead of kq−1 − kq nodes. Storage nodes will still use the way similar to that
for the error-free network in Section VI-A to send symbols. The reconstruction algorithm is described
in Algorithm 6 with the detection probability described in Theorem 4.
Algorithm 6 (Detection mode). DC reconstructs the original file in hostile network
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 , we can divide the symbol vector y˜′i,l into A/αl equal row vectors:
[y˜′i,l,1, y˜
′
i,l,2, · · · , y˜
′
i,l,A/αl
]. y˜′i,l = y˜i,l + ei,l is the response from the ith storage node. If y˜i,l
has been modified by the malicious node i, we have ei,l ∈ (Fq2)A\{0}. To detect whether there
are errors, we will reconstruct the original file from two sets of storage nodes then compare the
results. (Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ kl.)
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Step 2: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, DC can reconstruct the matrices related to the
original file:
Step 2.1: Let R′ = [y˜′T0,l,t, y˜′T1,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tkl,l,t]
T
.
Step 2.2: Let R1′ = [y˜′T0,l,t, y˜′T1,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tαl,l,t]
T
, which are the symbols collected from node 0 to
node kl − 1 = αl, then we have V0,αl,l ·
S1
T1
 = R1′. Solve S1, T1 using the method same to
algorithm 5.
Step 2.3: Let R2′ = [y˜′T0,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tαl−1,l,t, y˜
′T
αl+1,l,t
]T , which are the symbols collected from node
0 to node kl = αl+1 except node αl, and ΨDC2 =

ν0,l
.
.
.
ναl−1,l
ναl+1,l
, then we have ΨDC2 ·
S2
T2
 = R2′.
Solve S2, T2 using the method same to algorithm 5.
Step 2.4: Compare [S1, T1] with [S2, T2]. If they are the same, let [Sl,t, Tl,t] = [S1, T1]. Oth-
erwise, errors are detected in the received symbols. Exit the algorithm and switch to recovery
reconstruction mode.
Step 3: No error has been detected for the calculating of the reconstruction so far. So DC can reconstruct
the original file from all the matrices Sl,t, Tl,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl.
Theorem 4 (H-MSR Reconstruction–Detection Mode). When the number of malicious nodes in the kl+1
nodes of Algorithm 6 is less than kl + 1, the probability for the bogus symbols sent from the malicious
nodes to be detected is at least 1− (1/q2)2(αl−2).
Proof: We arrange this proof as follows. We will first study the requirements for S1 = S2, T1 = T2
in Algorithm 6 which will lead to the failure of the Algorithm when there are bogus symbols. Then we
will study the corresponding failure probabilities depending on different values of λi of the matrix ∆
defined in section IV.
For convenience we write ei,l,t as ei in the proof. ei ∈ [Fq2 ]αl for 0 ≤ i ≤ αl + 1. We also write
ΨDC = [ΦDC ,∆DC · ΦDC ], where ΦDC =

µ0
µ1
.
.
.
µkl−1
 and µi represents µi,l which is the i
th row of the
encoding matrix Φl defined in section IV.
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Step 1. Derive the requirements: For R1′ = R1 +W1 in Algorithm 6, we have:
ΦDC1S1Φ
T
DC1 +∆DC1ΦDC1T1Φ
T
DC1 = R1Φ
T
DC1 +W1Φ
T
DC1, (32)
where ΦDC1 =

µ0
µ1
.
.
.
µαl
, W1 =

e0
e1
.
.
.
eαl
. Suppose C1 = ΦDC1S1Φ
T
DC1,D1 = ΦDC1T1Φ
T
DC1, we can write
equation (32) as:
C1 +∆DC1D1 = R1Φ
T
DC1 +W1Φ
T
DC1 = Rˆ1 + Wˆ1. (33)
It is easy to see that C1 and D1 are symmetric, so we haveC1,i,j + λi ·D1,i,j = Rˆ1,i,j + Wˆ1,i,jC1,i,j + λj ·D1,i,j = Rˆ1,j,i + Wˆ1,j,i , (34)
where C1,i,j,D1,i,j , Rˆ1,i,j, Wˆ1,i,j are the elements in the ith row, jth column of C1,D1, Rˆ1, Wˆ1 respec-
tively. Solve equation (34) for all the i, j (i 6= j, 0 ≤ i ≤ αl, 0 ≤ j ≤ αl−1), we can get the corresponding
C1,i,j,D1,i,j . Because the structure of C1 and D1 are the same, we will only focus on C1 (corresponding
to S1) in the proof. The calculation for D1 (corresponding to T1) is the same.
ΦDC1S1Φ
T
DC1 =

µ0
µ1
.
.
.
µαl
 · S1 · [µ
T
0 , µ
T
1 , · · · , µ
T
αl ] = C1. (35)
So the elements of the ith row of C1 (except the element in the diagonal position) can be written as:
µi · S1 · [µ
T
0 , · · · , µ
T
i−1, µ
T
i+1 · · · , µ
T
αl ] = [C1,i,0, · · · , C1,i,i−1, C1,i,i+1, · · · , C1,i,αl ]. (36)
Let Ω =

µ0
µ1
.
.
.
µαl−1
, then Ω is an αl × αl full rank matrix, and we can derive S1 from
Ω · S1 =

[C1,0,1, C1,0,2, · · · , C1,0,αl ][µ
T
1 , µ
T
2 , · · · , µ
T
αl ]
−1
[C1,1,0, C1,1,2, · · · , C1,1,αl ][µ
T
0 , µ
T
2 , · · · , µ
T
αl ]
−1
· · ·
[C1,αl−1,0, C1,αl−1,1, · · · , C1,αl−1,αl ][µ
T
0 , µ
T
1 , · · · , µ
T
αl ]
−1
 . (37)
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For R2′ = R2 +W2 in Algorithm 6, we can get Ω · S2 the same way. If Ω · S1 = Ω · S2, Algorithm 6
will fail to detect the errors. This will happen if all the rows of Ω · S1 and Ω · S2 are the same. So we
will focus on the ith row of Ω · S1 and Ω · S2.
Step 2. Calculate the failure probabilities: Depending on the values of λi, we discuss two cases:
(a) If none of the λi (0 ≤ i ≤ αl) equals to 0, we can solve C1,i,j in equation (34):
C1,i,j =
λj · Rˆ1,i,j − λi · Rˆ1,j,i
λi · λj
+
ei · µ
T
j
λi
−
ej · µ
T
i
λj
= N1,i,j +Q1,i,j. (38)
In equation (38), N1,i,j represents the original solution without errors, while Q1,i,j represents the impact
of the errors. So the ith row of Ω · S1 can be written as:
[C1,i,0, · · · , C1,i,i−1, C1,i,i+1, · · · , C1,i,αl ] ·Π
−1
1,i
= [N1,i,0, · · · , N1,i,i−1, N1,i,i+1, · · · , N1,i,αl ] · Π
−1
1,i
+[Q1,i,0, · · · , Q1,i,i−1, Q1,i,i+1, · · · , Q1,i,αl ] · Π
−1
1,i (39)
= ξi + δ1,i,
where Π1,i = [µT0 , · · · , µTi−1, µTi+1, · · · , µTαl ]. ξi corresponds to the part independent of the errors. δ1,i is
the error part and can be further expanded as:
δ1,i =
[
ei · µ
T
0
λi
, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
i−1
λi
,
ei · µ
T
i+1
λi
, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
αl
λi
]
·Π−11,i
−
[
e0 · µ
T
i
λ0
, · · · ,
ei−1 · µ
T
i
λi−1
,
ei+1 · µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eαl · µ
T
i
λαl
]
·Π−11,i . (40)
The first part of equation (40) can be reduced as follows:[
ei · µ
T
0
λi
, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
i−1
λi
,
ei · µ
T
i+1
λi
, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
αl
λi
]
·Π−11,i
=
ei
λi
·
[
µT0 , · · · , µ
T
i−1, µ
T
i+1, · · · , µ
T
αl
]
· Π−11,i (41)
=
ei
λi
.
So we have:
δ1,i =
ei
λi
−
[
e0 · µ
T
i
λ0
, · · · ,
ei−1 · µ
T
i
λi−1
,
ei+1 · µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eαl · µ
T
i
λαl
]
· Π−11,i
=
ei
λi
− ρ1,i. (42)
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For R2′ = R2 +W2 in Algorithm 6 where W2 =

e0
.
.
.
eαl−1
eαl+1
, we can derive C2,i,j , then Ω ·S2 the same
way. The ith row of Ω · S2 can be written as:
ξi + δ2,i = ξi +
ei
λi
− ρ2,i, (43)
where ρ2,i =
[
e0·µTi
λ0
, · · · , ei−1·µ
T
i
λi−1
, ei+1·µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eα
l
−1·µTi
λα
l
−1
,
eα
l
+1·µTi
λα
l
+1
]
· Π−12,i , Π2,i = [µ
T
0 , · · · , µ
T
i−1, µ
T
i+1,
· · · , µTαl−1, µ
T
αl+1].
Because Π1,i is a full rank matrix, ρ1,i = ρ2,i is equivalent to ρ1,i · Π1,i = ρ2,i · Π1,i. Similar to the
proof of Lemma 1, suppose Π−12,i =

η0
.
.
.
ηαl−1
ηαl+1
, we have ηs · µ
T
r =
1 r = s0 r 6= s . So
ρ1,i · Π1,i =
[
· · · ,
ei−1 · µ
T
i
λi−1
,
ei+1 · µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eαl−1 · µ
T
i
λαl−1
,
eαl · µ
T
i
λαl
]
, (44)
ρ2,i · Π1,i =
[
· · · ,
ei−1 · µ
T
i
λi−1
,
ei+1 · µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eαl−1 · µ
T
i
λαl−1
, x2,αl
]
. (45)
Because µT0 , · · · , µTi−1, µTi+1, · · · , µTαl−1, µ
T
αl+1 are linearly independent, they can be viewed as a set
of bases of the αl dimensional linear space. So we have
µTαl =
r=αl+1∑
r=0,r 6=i,αl
ζr · µ
T
r . (46)
Thus
x2,αl =
[
· · · ,
ei−1 · µ
T
i
λi−1
,
ei+1 · µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eαl−1 · µ
T
i
λαl−1
,
eαl+1 · µ
T
i
λαl+1
]
·Π−12,i ·
 r=αl+1∑
r=0,r 6=i,αl
ζr · µ
T
r

=
 r=αl+1∑
r=0,r 6=i,αl
ζr ·
er · µ
T
i
λr
 . (47)
If
eαl · µ
T
i
λαl
=
r=αl+1∑
r=0,r 6=i,αl
ζr ·
er · µ
T
i
λr
(0 ≤ i ≤ αl − 1), (48)
ρ1,i and ρ2,i will be equal, so are Ω · S1 and Ω · S2. Therefore, Algorithm 6 will fail.
For the error ei (0 ≤ i ≤ αl + 1), the following equation holds:
ei · [µ
T
0 , µ
T
1 , · · · , µ
T
αl−1] = [eˆi,0, eˆi,1, · · · , eˆi,αl−1] = eˆi. (49)
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Because [µT0 , µT1 , · · · , µTαl−1] is a full rank matrix, there is a one-to-one mapping between ei and eˆi.
Equation (48) can be written as:
eˆαl,i
λαl
=
r=αl+1∑
r=0,r 6=i,αl
ζr ·
eˆr,i
λr
(0 ≤ i ≤ αl − 1). (50)
When the number of malicious nodes in the kl + 1 nodes is less than kl + 1, the malicious nodes can
collude to satisfy equation (50) for at most one particular i. So the probability that equation (50) holds
is 1/q2 for at least αl − 1 out of αl i′s between 0 and αl − 1. If we consider equation (50) for all the
i′s simultaneously, the probability will be at most (1/q2)αl−1. As discussed before, the probability for
T1 = T2 will be at most (1/q2)αl−1. In this case, the detection probability is at least 1− (1/q2)2(αl−1).
(b) If one of the λi (0 ≤ i ≤ αl) equals to 0, we can assume λ0 = 0 without loss of generality. When
i = 0, the solution for equation (34) is:
C1,0,j = Rˆ1,0,j + e0 · µ
T
j = N1,0,j +Q1,0,j. (51)
Similar to equations (39), (40) and (41), we have δ1,0 = e0. For R2′ = R2 +W2, it is easy to see that
δ2,0 = e0. So the first rows of Ω · S1 and Ω · S2 are the same no matter what the error vector e0 is.
When i > 0, j = 0, the solution for equation (34) is:
C1,i,0 = Rˆ1,i,0 + 0 · µ
T
0 + e0 · µ
T
i = N1,i,0 +Q1,i,0, (52)
where 0 is a zero row vector. When i > 0, j > 0, the solution has the same expression as equation (38).
In this case, for the ith (i > 0) row of Ω · S1, equation (40) can be written as:
δ1,i =
[
0, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
i−1
λi
,
ei · µ
T
i+1
λi
, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
αl
λi
]
· Π−11,i
−
[
−e0 · µ
T
i , · · · ,
ei−1 · µ
T
i
λi−1
,
ei+1 · µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eαl · µ
T
i
λαl
]
·Π−11,i . (53)
The first part of equation (53) can be divided into two parts:[
ei · µ
T
0
λi
, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
i−1
λi
,
ei · µ
T
i+1
λi
, · · · ,
ei · µ
T
αl
λi
]
· Π−11,i −
[
ei · µ
T
0
λi
,0, · · · ,0
]
· Π−11,i
=
ei
λi
−
ei
λi
· [µT0 ,0, · · · ,0] · Π
−1
1,i . (54)
So equation (53) can be further written as:
δ1,i =
ei
λi
−
[
ei · µ
T
0
λi
− e0 · µ
T
i , · · · ,
ei−1 · µ
T
i
λi−1
,
ei+1 · µ
T
i
λi+1
, · · · ,
eαl · µ
T
i
λαl
]
·Π−11,i
=
ei
λi
− ρ1,i. (55)
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By employing the same derivation in case (a), for 1 ≤ i ≤ αl − 1, ρ1,i and ρ2,i will be equal if
eαl · µ
T
i
λαl
=
r=αl+1∑
r=1,r 6=i,αl
ζr ·
er · µ
T
i
λr
− ζ0 · e0 · µ
T
i + ζ0 ·
ei · µ
T
0
λi
, (56)
eˆαl,i
λαl
=
r=αl+1∑
r=1,r 6=i,αl
ζr ·
eˆr,i
λr
− ζ0 · eˆ0,i + ζ0 ·
eˆi,0
λi
. (57)
When the number of malicious nodes in the kl + 1 nodes is less than kl + 1, similar to case (a), the
probability that equation (57) holds is 1/q2 for at least αl − 2 out of αl − 1 i′s between 1 and αl − 1.
If we consider equation (57) for all the i′s simultaneously, the probability will be at most (1/q2)αl−2.
Here the probability for T1 = T2 will be at most (1/q2)αl−2. In this case, the detection probability is
1− (1/q2)2(αl−2).
Combining both cases, the detection probability is at least 1− (1/q2)2(αl−2).
2) Recovery Mode: Once DC detects errors using Algorithm 6, it will send integer j = q − 1 to all
the q2 nodes in the network requesting symbols. Storage nodes will still use the way similar to that of
the error-free network in Section VI-A to send symbols. The reconstruct procedures are described in
Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 (Recovery mode). DC reconstructs the original file in hostile network
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 , we divide the symbol vector y˜′i,l into A/αl equal row vectors:
[y˜′i,l,1, y˜
′
i,l,2, · · · , y˜
′
i,l,A/αl
]. (Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1.)
Step 2: For every q − 1 ≥ l ≥ 0 in descending order and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl in ascending order, DC can
reconstruct the matrices related to the original file when the errors in the received symbol vectors
y˜′i,l,t from q2 storage nodes can be corrected:
Step 2.1: Let R′ = [y˜′T0,l,t, y˜′T1,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tq2−1,l,t]T .
Step 2.2: If the number of corrupted nodes detected is larger than min{q2−kl, ⌊(q2−kq−1)/2⌋},
then the number of errors have exceeded the error correction capability. We will flag the decoding
failure and exit the algorithm.
Step 2.3: Since the number of errors is within the error correction capability of the H-MSR
code, substitute y˜′i,l,t in R′ with the symbol ⊗ representing an erasure vector if node i has been
detected to be corrupted in the previous loops (previous values of l, t).
Step 2.4: Solve Sl,t, Tl,t using the method described in section VI-C. If symbols from node i
are detected to be erroneous during the calculation, mark node i as corrupted.
Step 3: DC reconstructs the original file from all the matrices Sl,t, Tl,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ q−1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl.
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For data reconstruction described in Algorithm 7, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 5 (H-MSR Reconstruction–Recovery Mode). For data reconstruction, the number of errors
that the H-MSR code can correct is
τH−MSR = q · ⌊(q
2 − kq−1)/2⌋. (58)
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 3 in data regeneration, for data reconstruction Algorithm 7,
H-MSR code can be viewed as q MDS codes with parameters (q2− 1, kl− 1, q2− kl+1). The decoding
for the reconstruction is performed from the code with the largest minimum distance to the code with
the smallest minimum distance as in the data regeneration case. So here we have similar result as in
equation (31).
C. Recover Matrices Sl,t, Tl,t from q2 Storage Nodes
When there are bogus symbols p˜′i,l,t sent by the corrupted nodes for certain l, t, we can recover the
matrices Sl,t, Tl,t as follows:
For R′ in Algorithm 7, we have ΨDC ·
S′
T ′
 = R′, and
ΦDCS
′ΦTDC +∆DCΦDCT
′ΦTDC = R
′ΦTDC , (59)
where ΨDC = [ΦDC ,∆DC · ΦDC ], ΦDC =

µ0
µ1
.
.
.
µq2−1
 and µi represents µi,l which is the i
th row of the
encoding matrix Φl in the proof of Theorem 1.
Let C = ΦDCS′ΦTDC , D = ΦDCT ′ΦTDC , and Rˆ′ = R′ΦTDC , then
C +∆DCD = Rˆ
′. (60)
Since C,D are both symmetric, we can solve the non-diagonal elements of them as follows:Ci,j + λi ·Di,j = Rˆ′i,jCi,j + λj ·Di,j = Rˆ′j,i . (61)
Because matrices C and D have the same structure, here we only focus on C (corresponding to S′). It
is straightforward to see that if node i is malicious and there are errors in the ith row of R′, there will
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be errors in the ith row of Rˆ′. Furthermore, there will be errors in the ith row and ith column of C .
Define S′ΦTDC = Sˆ′, we have
ΦDC Sˆ
′ = C. (62)
Here we can view each column of C as a (q2−1, αl, q2−αl) MDS code because ΦDC is a Vandermonde
matrix. The length of the code is q2 − 1 since the diagonal elements of C is unknown. Suppose node j
is uncorrupted. If the number of erasures σ (corresponding to the previously detected corrupted nodes)
and the number of the corrupted nodes τ that have not been detected satisfy:
σ + 2τ + 1 ≤ q2 − αl, (63)
then the jth column of C can be recovered and the error locations (corresponding to the corrupted nodes)
can be pinpointed. The non-diagonal elements of C can be recovered. So DC can reconstruct Sl,t using
the method similar to [4]. For Tl,t, the recovering process is similar.
VII. ENCODING H-MBR CODE
In this section, we will analyze the H-MBR code based on the MBR point with β = 1. According to
equation (3), we have d = α.
Let α0, · · · , αq−1 be a strictly decreasing integer sequence satisfying 0 < αi ≤ κ(i), 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1.
The least common multiple of α0, · · · , αq−1 is A. Let k0, · · · , kq−1 be a integer sequence satisfying
0 < ki ≤ αi, 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1. Suppose the data contains B = A ·
∑q−1
i=0 (ki(2αi − ki + 1)/(2αi)) message
symbols from the finite field Fq2 . In practice, if the size of the actual data is larger than B symbols, we
can fragment it into blocks of size B and process each block individually.
We arrange the B symbols into matrix M as below:
M =

M0
M1
.
.
.
Mq−1
 , (64)
where
Mi = [Mi,1,Mi,2, · · · ,Mi,A/αi ] (65)
and
Mi,j =
Si,j Ti,j
T Ti,j 0.
 (66)
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Si,j, 0 ≤ i ≤ q− 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi is a symmetric matrix of size ki× ki with the upper-triangular entries
filled by data symbols. Ti,j is a ki × (αi − ki) matrix. Thus Mi,j contains ki(2αi − ki + 1)/2 symbols,
Mi contains A · ki(2αi − ki + 1)/(2αi) symbols and M contains B symbols.
For distributed storage, we encode M using Algorithm 8:
Algorithm 8. Encoding H-MBR Code
Step 1: First we encode the data matrices M defined above using a Hermitian code Hm over Fq2 with
parameters κ(j) (0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1) and m (m ≥ q2 − 1). The q3 × A codeword matrix can be
written as Y = Hm(M).
Step 2: Then we divide the codeword matrix Y into q2 submatrices Y0, · · · , Yq2−1 of the size q×A and
store one submatrix in each of the q2 storage nodes as shown in Fig. 1.
Then we have the following theorem:
Theorem 6. By processing the data symbols using Algorithm 8, we can achieve the MBR point in
distributed storage.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, we can get the following equation considering all the
columns of Hm(M):
Φi ·Mi,j = Gi,j , (67)
where Gi,j = [G(1)i , · · · ,G
(αi)
i ], 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi. G
(l)
i corresponds to the lth column of the
submatrix Mi,j and each element of Gi = [gi(0), gi(1), · · · , gi(φq
2−2)]T can be derived from a distinct
storage node. Φi is defined in equation (12).
Next we will study the optimality of the code in the sense of the MBR point. For Φi ·Mi,j, 0 ≤ i ≤
q − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, Mi,j is symmetric and satisfies the requirements for MBR point according to [4]
with parameters d = αi, k = ki, α = αi, β = 1, B = ki(2αi − ki +1)/2. By encoding M using Hm(M)
and distributing Y0, · · · , Yq2−1 into q2 storage nodes, each row of the matrix Φi ·Mi,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ q−1, 1 ≤
j ≤ A/αi, can be derived in a corresponding storage node. Because Φi ·Mi,j achieves the MBR point,
data related to matrices Mi,j , 0 ≤ i ≤ q − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A/αi, can be regenerated at the MBR point.
Therefore, Algorithm 8 can achieve the MBR point.
VIII. REGENERATION OF THE H-MBR CODE
In this section, we will first discuss regeneration of the H-MBR code in error-free network. Then we
will discuss regeneration in hostile network.
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A. Regeneration in Error-free Network
Let wi = [g0(φ(si)), g1(φ(si)), · · · , gq−1(φ(si))]T , then wi = B−1i · yi = [g0(φsi), · · · , gq−1(φsi)]T ,
for every column yi of Yi.
The main idea of the regeneration algorithms is similar to that of the H-MSR code: regenerate
gl(φ(
si)), 0 ≤ l ≤ q− 1, by downloading help symbols from dl = αl nodes, where dl is the regeneration
parameter d for gl(φ(si)) in the H-MBR code regeneration.
Suppose node z fails, we use Algorithm 9 to regenerate the exact H-MBR code symbols of node z.
For convenience, we suppose dq = αq = 0 and define
Wi,j,l =

µi,l
µi+1,l
.
.
.
µj,l
 , (68)
where µt,l, i ≤ t ≤ j, is the tth row of Φl.
Similar to the H-MSR code, replacement node z′ will send requests to helper nodes in the way same
to that in Section V-A. Upon receiving the request integer j, helper node i will calculate and send the
help symbols similar to that of Section V-A.
When the replacement node z′ receives all the requested symbols, it can regenerate the symbols stored
in the failed node z using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 9. z′ regenerates symbols of the failed node z
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q− 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, we can calculate the regenerated symbols which are
related to the help symbols p˜i,l,t from dl helper nodes: (Without loss of generality, we assume
0 ≤ i ≤ dl − 1.)
Step 1.1: Let p = [p˜0,l,t, p˜1,l,t, · · · , p˜dl−1,l,t]T , solve the equation: W0,dl−1,l · x = p.
Step 1.2: Since x =Ml,t ·µTz,l and Ml,t is symmetric, we can calculate y˜z,l,t = xT = µz,l ·Ml,t.
Step 2: Let Y˜z be a q ×A matrix with the lth row defined as [y˜z,l,1, · · · , y˜z,l,A/αl ], 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1.
Step 3: Calculate the regenerated symbols of the failed node z: Yz′ = Yz = Bz · Y˜z .
For Algorithm 9 we can derive the equivalent storage parameters for each symbol block of size
Bj = Akj(2αj − kj + 1)/(2αj) : d = αj, k = kj , α = A, β = A/αj , 0 ≤ j ≤ q − 1 and equation (3)
of the MBR point holds for these parameters. Theorem 6 guarantees that Algorithm 9 can achieve the
MBR point for data regeneration of the H-MBR code.
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B. Regeneration in Hostile Network
In hostile network, Algorithm 9 may be unable to regenerate the failed node due to the possible bogus
symbols received from the responses. In fact, even if the replacement node z′ can derive the symbol
matrix Yz′ using Algorithm 9, it cannot verify the correctness of the result.
Similar to the H-MSR code, there are two modes for the helper nodes to regenerate the H-MBR code
of a failed storage node in hostile network. One mode is the detection mode, in which no error has been
found in the symbols received from the helper nodes. Once errors are detected, the recovery mode will
be used to correct the errors and locate the malicious nodes.
1) Detection Mode: In the detection mode, the replacement node z′ will send requests in the way
similar to that of the error-free network in Section VIII-A. The only difference is that when j = q − 1,
z′ sends requests to dq−1− dq +1 nodes instead of dq−1− dq nodes. Helper nodes will still use the way
similar to that of the error-free network in Section VIII-A to send the help symbols. The regeneration
algorithm is described in Algorithm 10 with the detection probability characterized in Theorem 7.
Algorithm 10 (Detection mode). z′ regenerates symbols of the failed node z in hostile network
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q− 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, we can calculate the regenerated symbols which are
related to the help symbols p˜′i,l,t from dl helper nodes. p˜′i,l,t = p˜i,l,t + ei,l,t is the response from
the ith helper node. If p˜i,l,t has been modified by the malicious node i, we have ei,l,t ∈ Fq2\{0}.
To detect whether there are errors, we will calculate symbols from two sets of helper nodes then
compare the results. (Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ dl.)
Step 1.1: Let p1′ = [p˜′0,l,t, p˜′1,l,t, · · · , p˜′dl−1,l,t]
T
, where the symbols are collected from node 0
to node dl − 1, solve the equation W0,dl−1,l · x1 = p1′.
Step 1.2: Let p2′ = [p˜′1,l,t, p˜′2,l,t, · · · , p˜′dl,l,t]
T
, where the symbols are collected from node 1 to
node dl, solve the equation W1,dl,l · x2 = p2′.
Step 1.3: If x1 = x2, compute y˜z,l,t = µz,l ·Ml,t as described in Algorithm 9. Otherwise, errors
are detected in the help symbols. Exit the algorithm and switch to recovery regeneration mode.
Step 2: No error has been detected for the calculating of the regeneration so far. Let Y˜z be a q × A
matrix with the lth row defined as [y˜z,l,1, · · · , y˜z,l,A/αl ], 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1.
Step 3: Calculate the regenerated symbols of the failed node z: Yz′ = Yz = Bz · Y˜z .
Theorem 7 (H-MBR Regeneration–Detection Mode). When the number of malicious nodes in the dl+1
helper nodes of Algorithm 10 is less than dl + 1, the probability for the bogus symbols sent from the
malicious nodes to be detected is at least 1− 1/q2.
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Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 2, we can write
x1 = x+W
−1
0,dl−1,l
· [e0, · · · , edl−1]
T = x+ xˆ1, (69)
x2 = x+W
−1
1,dl,l
· [e1, · · · , edl ]
T = x+ xˆ2. (70)
Since W0,dl−1,l,W1,dl,l are full rank matrices like the matrices V0,dl−1,l,V1,dl,l in the proof of
Lemma 1 and any dl vectors out of µ0,l, µ1,l, · · · , µdl,l are linearly independent, the rest of this proof
is similar to that of Lemma 1. When the number of malicious nodes in the dl + 1 helper nodes is less
than dl + 1, the probability for xˆ1 = xˆ2 is at most 1/q2. Therefore, the detection probability is at least
1− 1/q2.
2) Recovery Mode: Once the replacement node z′ detects errors using Algorithm 10, it will send
integer j = q−1 to all the other q2−1 nodes in the network requesting help symbols. Helper nodes will
still use the way similar to that of the error-free network in Section VIII-A to send the help symbols. z′
can regenerate symbols using Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11 (Recovery mode). z′ regenerates symbols of the failed node z in hostile network
Step 1: For every q − 1 ≥ l ≥ 0 in descending order and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl in ascending order, we can
regenerate the symbols when the errors in the received help symbols p˜′i,l,t from q2 − 1 helper
nodes can be corrected. Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 2.
Step 1.1: Let p′ = [p˜′0,l,t, p˜′1,l,t, · · · , p˜′q2−2,l,t]T . Since W0,q2−2,l · x = p′, p′ can be viewed as
an MDS code with parameters (q2 − 1, dl, q2 − dl).
Step 1.2: Substitute p˜′i,l,t in p′ with the symbol ⊗ representing an erasure if node i has been
detected to be corrupted in the previous loops (previous values of l, t).
Step 1.3: If the number of erasures in p′ is larger than min{q2−dl−1, ⌊(q2−dq−1−1)/2⌋}, then
the number of errors have exceeded the error correction capability. We will flag the decoding
failure and exit the algorithm.
Step 1.4: Since the number of errors is within the error correction capability of the MDS code,
decode p′ to p′cw and solve x.
Step 1.5: If the ith position symbols of p′cw and p′ are different, mark node i as corrupted.
Step 1.6: Compute y˜z,l,t = µz,l ·Ml,t as described in Algorithm 9.
Step 2: Let Y˜z be a q ×A matrix with the lth row defined as [y˜z,l,1, · · · , y˜z,l,A/αl ], 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1.
Step 3: Calculate the regenerated symbols of the failed node z: Yz′ = Yz = Bz · Y˜z .
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For data regeneration described in Algorithm 11, since the structures of the underlying Hermitian codes
of H-MSR code and H-MBR code with the same code rates are the same, we have similar result as that
in Theorem 3.
Theorem 8 (H-MBR Regeneration–Recovery Mode). For data regeneration, the number of errors that
the H-MBR code can correct is
τH−MBR = q · ⌊(q
2 − dq−1 − 1)/2⌋. (71)
IX. RECONSTRUCTION OF THE H-MBR CODE
In this section, we will first discuss reconstruction of the H-MBR code in error-free network. Then we
will discuss reconstruction when there are corrupted nodes in the network.
A. Reconstruction in Error-free Network
The main idea of the reconstruction algorithms is similar to that of the H-MSR code: reconstruct
gl(φ(
si)), 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1, by downloading help symbols from kl nodes, where kl represents the recon-
struction parameter k for gl(φ(si)) in the H-MBR code. We use Algorithm 12 in the network for the
data collector DC to reconstruct the original file. For convenience, we suppose kq = 0.
Similar to the H-MSR code described in Section VI-A, DC will send requests to storage nodes. Upon
receiving the request integer j, node i will calculate and send symbols. When DC receives all the requested
symbols, it can reconstruct the original file using the following algorithm:
Algorithm 12. DC reconstructs the original file
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q−1, divide the symbol vector y˜i,l into A/αl equal row vectors: [y˜i,l,1, y˜i,l,2,
· · · , y˜i,l,A/αl ]. ( y˜i,l is the response from the ith node and we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ kl − 1 without
loss of generality.)
Step 2: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q− 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, DC reconstructs the matrices related to the original
file:
Step 2.1: Let R = [y˜T0,l,t, y˜T1,l,t, · · · , y˜Tkl−1,l,t]
T
, we have the equation: W0,kl−1,l · Ml,t = R
according to the encoding algorithm.
Step 2.2: DC reconstructs Ml,t using techniques similar to that of [4].
Step 3: DC reconstructs the original file from all the matrices Ml,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl.
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B. Reconstruction in Hostile Network
Similar to the H-MSR code, the reconstruction algorithms for H-MBR code in error-free network
do not work in hostile network. Even if the data collecter can calculate the symbol matrices M using
Algorithm 12, it cannot verify whether the result is correct or not. There are two modes for the original
file to be reconstructed in hostile network. One mode is the detection mode, in which no error has been
found in the symbols received from the storage nodes. Once errors are detected in the detection mode,
the recovery mode will be used to correct the errors and locate the malicious nodes.
1) Detection Mode: In the detection mode, DC will send requests in the way similar to that of the
error-free network in Section IX-A. The only difference is that when j = q − 1, DC will send requests
to kq−1 − kq + 1 nodes instead of kq−1 − kq nodes. Storage nodes will send symbols similar to that of
the error-free network in Section IX-A. The reconstruction algorithm is described in Algorithm 13 with
the detection probability described in Theorem 9.
Algorithm 13 (Detection mode). DC reconstructs the original file in hostile network
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 , we can divide the symbol vector y˜′i,l into A/αl equal row vectors:
[y˜′i,l,1, y˜
′
i,l,2, · · · , y˜
′
i,l,A/αl
]. y˜′i,l = y˜i,l + ei,l is the response from the ith storage node. If y˜i,l
has been modified by the malicious node i, we have ei,l ∈ (Fq2)A\{0}. To detect whether there
are errors, we will reconstruct the original file from two sets of storage nodes then compare the
results. (Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ kl.)
Step 2: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl, DC can reconstruct the matrices related to the
original file:
Step 2.1: Let R′ = [y˜′T0,l,t, y˜′T1,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tkl,l,t]
T
.
Step 2.2: Let R1′ = [y˜′T0,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tkl−1,l,t]
T
, which are the symbols collected from node 0 to node
kl − 1, then we have W0,kl−1,l ·M1 = R1′. Solve M1 using the method same to algorithm 12.
Step 2.3: Let R2′ = [y˜′T1,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tkl,l,t]
T
, which are the symbols collected from node 1 to node
kl, then we have W1,kl,l ·M2 = R2′. Solve M2 using the method same to algorithm 12.
Step 2.4: Compare M1 with M2. If they are the same, let Ml,t = M1. Otherwise, errors are
detected in the received symbols. Exit the algorithm and switch to recovery reconstruction mode.
Step 3: No error has been detected for the calculating of the reconstruction so far. So DC can reconstruct
the original file from all the matrices Ml,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl.
Theorem 9 (H-MBR Reconstruction–Detection Mode). When the number of malicious nodes in the kl+1
nodes of Algorithm 13 is less than kl +1, the probability for the bogus symbols sent from the malicious
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nodes to be detected is at least 1− 1/q2αl .
Proof: For convenience, we write ei,l,t as ei in the proof. ei ∈ [Fq2 ]αl for 0 ≤ i ≤ kl. In Algorithm 13,
R1
′ = R1 + Q1 where Q1 =

e0
e1
.
.
.
ekl−1
. Let W0,kl−1,l = [ΩDC1,∆DC1], R1 = [R1,1, R1,2] and Q1 =
[Q1,1, Q1,2], where ΩDC1, R1,1, Q1,1 are kl × kl submatrices and ∆DC1, R1,2, Q1,2 are kl × (αl − kl)
submatrices.
According to equation (66), we have
W0,kl−1,l ·M1 = [ΩDC1S1 +∆DC1T
T
1 ,ΩDC1T1]
= [R1,1 +Q1,1, R1,2 +Q1,2]. (72)
Since ΩDC1 is a submatrix of a Vandermonde matrix, it is a full rank matrix. So we have
T1 = Ω
−1
DC1R1,2 +Ω
−1
DC1Q1,2 = T + Tˆ1, (73)
S1 = Ω
−1
DC1(R1,1 +Q1,1 −∆DC1T
T
1 )
= Ω−1DC1(R1,1 −∆DC1T
T ) + Ω−1DC1(Q1,1 −∆DC1Tˆ
T
1 )
= S +Ω−1DC1(Q1,1 −∆DC1Tˆ
T
1 ) = S + Sˆ1. (74)
For R2′ = R2 + Q2 in Algorithm 13, Let R2 = [R2,1, R2,2], Q2 = [Q2,1, Q2,2] and W1,kl,l =
[ΩDC2,∆DC2], where R2,1, Q2,1, ΩDC2 are kl× kl submatrices and R2,2, Q2,2, ∆DC2 are kl× (αl− kl)
submatrices. Similarly, we have
T2 = Ω
−1
DC2R2,2 +Ω
−1
DC2Q2,2 = T + Tˆ2, (75)
S2 = S +Ω
−1
DC2(Q2,1 −∆DC2Tˆ
T
2 ) = S + Sˆ2. (76)
If Tˆ1 = Tˆ2 and Sˆ1 = Sˆ2, Algorithm 13 will fail to detect the bogus symbols. So we will focus on Tˆ1, Tˆ2
and Sˆ1, Sˆ2.
Suppose Π1,j = [e0, · · · , ekl−1]T ,Π2,j = [e1, · · · , ekl ]T are the jth, 1 ≤ j ≤ αl − kl, columns of Q1,2
and Q2,2 respectively, where ei ∈ Fq2 . Since ΩDC1 and ΩDC2 are Vandermonde matrices and have the
same relationship as that of between V0,dl−1,l and V1,dl,l, similar as the proof of Lemma 1, we can
prove that when the number of malicious nodes in the kl+1 nodes is less than kl+1, the probability of
Ω−1DC1Π1,j = Ω
−1
DC2Π2,j is at most 1/q2. Thus the probability for Tˆ1 = Tˆ2 is at most 1/q2(αl−kl). Through
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the same procedure, we can derive that the probability of Sˆ1 = Sˆ2 is at most 1/q2kl . The probability for
both Sˆ1 = Sˆ2 and Tˆ1 = Tˆ2 is at most 1/q2αl . So the detection probability is at least 1− 1/q2αl .
2) Recovery Mode: Once DC detects errors using Algorithm 13, it will send integer j = q − 1 to
all the q2 nodes in the network requesting symbols. Storage node i will use the way similar to that of
the error-free network in Section IX-A to send symbols. The reconstruct procedures are described in
Algorithm 14.
Algorithm 14 (Recovery mode). DC reconstructs the original file in hostile network
Step 1: For every 0 ≤ l ≤ q−1 , divide the symbol vector y˜′i,l into A/αl equal row vectors: [y˜′i,l,1, y˜′i,l,2,
· · · , y˜′i,l,A/αl ]. (Without loss of generality, we assume 0 ≤ i ≤ q2 − 1.)
Step 2: For every q − 1 ≥ l ≥ 0 in descending order and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl in ascending order, DC
reconstructs the matrices related to the original file when the errors in the received symbol
vectors y˜′i,l,t from q2 storage nodes can be corrected:
Step 2.1: Let R′ = [y˜′T0,l,t, y˜′T1,l,t, · · · , y˜′Tq2−1,l,t]T .
Step 2.2: If the number of corrupted nodes detected is larger than min{q2−kl, ⌊(q2−kq−1)/2⌋},
then the number of errors have exceeded the error correction capability. So here we will flag the
decoding failure and exit the algorithm.
Step 2.3: Since the number of errors is within the error correction capability of the H-MBR
code, substitute y˜′i,l,t in R′ with the symbol ⊗ representing an erasure vector if node i has been
detected to be corrupted in the previous loops (previous values of l, t).
Step 2.4: Solve Ml,t using the method in section IX-C. If symbols from node i are detected to
be erroneous during the calculation, mark node i as corrupted.
Step 3: DC reconstructs the original file from all the matrices Ml,t, 0 ≤ l ≤ q − 1 and 1 ≤ t ≤ A/αl.
For data reconstruction described in Algorithm 14, since the structures of the underlying Hermitian
codes of H-MSR code and H-MBR code with the same code rates are the same, we have similar result
as that in Theorem 5.
Theorem 10 (H-MBR Reconstruction–Recovery Mode). For data reconstruction, the number of errors
that the H-MBR code can correct is
τH−MBR = q · ⌊(q
2 − kq−1)/2⌋. (77)
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C. Recover Matrices Mαl,t from q2 Storage Nodes
When there are bogus symbols p˜′i,l,t sent by the corrupted nodes for certain l, t, we can recover the
matrices Mαl,t as follows:
For R′ in Algorithm 14, we have ΦDC ·M ′ = R′, where ΦDC = W0,q2−1,l = [ΩDC ,∆DC ], R′ =
[R′1, R
′
2]. ΩDC , R
′
1 are q
2 × kl submatrices and ∆DC , R′2 are q2 × (αl − kl) submatrices.
According to equation (66), we have
ΦDC ·M
′ = [ΩDCS
′ +∆DCT
′T ,ΩDCT
′] = [R′1, R
′
2]. (78)
For R′2 = ΩDCT ′, we can view each column of R′2 as a (q2, kl, q2−kl+1) MDS code because ΦDC is
a Vandermonde matrix. If the number of erasures σ (corresponding to the previously detected corrupted
nodes) and the number of corrupted nodes τ that have not been detected satisfy:
σ + 2τ ≤ q2 − kl, (79)
then all the columns of T ′ can be recovered and the error locations (corresponding to the corrupted
nodes) can be pinpointed. After T ′ has been recovered, we can recover S′ following the same process
because ΩDCS′ = R′1 −∆DCT ′T . So DC can reconstruct Mαl,t.
X. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance of the H-MSR code and compare it with the performance
of the RS-MSR code. We will first analyze their error correction capability then their complexity.
The comparison results between the H-MBR code and the RS-MBR code are the same since the error
correction capability and the complexity of the H-MSR code and the H-MBR code are similar while
these performance parameters of the RS-MSR code and the RS-MBR code are similar.
A. Scalable Error Correction
1) Error correction for data regeneration: The RS-MSR code in [12] can correct up to τ errors by
downloading symbols from d+ 2τ nodes. However, the number of errors may vary in the symbols sent
by helper nodes. When there is no error or the number of errors is far less than τ , downloading symbols
from extra nodes will be a waste of bandwidth. When the number of errors is larger than τ , the decoding
process will fail without being detected. In this case, the symbols stored in the replacement node will be
erroneous. If this erroneous node becomes a helper node later, the errors will propagate to other nodes.
The H-MSR code can detect the erroneous decodings using Algorithm 3. If no error is detected,
regeneration of H-MSR only needs to download symbols from one more node than the regeneration in
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error-free network, while the extra cost for the RS-MSR code is 2τ . If errors are detected in the symbols
received from the helper nodes, the H-MSR code can correct the errors using Algorithm 4. Moreover,
the algorithm can determine whether the decoding is successful, while the RS-MSR code is unable to
provide such information.
2) Error correction for data reconstruction: The evaluation result is similar to the data regeneration.
The RS-MSR code can correct up to τ errors with support from 2τ additional helper nodes. The H-
MSR code is more flexible. For error detection, it only requires symbols from one additional node using
Algorithm 6. The errors can then be corrected using Algorithm 7. The algorithm can also determine
whether the decoding is successful.
B. Error Correction Capability
For data regeneration described in Algorithm 4, according to Theorem 3 and equation (31), the H-MSR
code can correct τH−MSR = q·⌊(q2−dq−1−1)/2⌋ errors, while the (q3−q,
∑q−1
l=0 dl, q
3−q−
∑q−1
l=0 dl+1)
RS-MSR code with the same rate can correct τRS−MSR = ⌊(q3− q−
∑q−1
l=0 dl)/2⌋ errors. Therefore, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 11. For data regeneration, the number of errors that the H-MSR code and the RS-MSR code
can correct satisfy τH−MSR > τRS−MSR when q ≥ 3.
Proof: For τRS−MSR, we have
τRS−MSR =
⌊(
q3 − q −
q−1∑
l=0
dl
)
/2
⌋
(80)
≤
⌊
(q3 − q − q · dq−1 −
q
2
(q − 1))/2
⌋
=
⌊
q · (q2 − dq−1 − 1)/2 −
q(q − 1)
4
⌋
≤ q · (q2 − dq−1 − 1)/2 −
q(q − 1)
4
.
For τH−MSR, we have
τH−MSR = q · ⌊(q
2 − dq−1 − 1)/2⌋. (81)
When q = 3, it is easy to verify that τH−MSR > τRS−MSR.
When q > 3, We can rewrite equation (81) as
τH−MSR ≥ q · (q
2 − dq−1 − 1)/2 − q/2. (82)
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The gap between τH−MSR and τRS−MSR is at least
q(q − 1)
4
−
q
2
=
q2 − 3q
4
> 0 , q > 3, (83)
so we have τH−MSR > τRS−MSR.
Example 1. Suppose q = 4 and m = 37, the Hermitian curve is defined by y4 + y = x5 over F42 .
From the previous discussion, we have κ(0) = 10, κ(1) = 9, κ(2) = 7, κ(3) = 6. Choose α0 = 6, α1 =
5, α2 = 4, α3 = 3. So d0 = 12, d1 = 10, d2 = 8, d3 = 6. According to the analysis above, we have
τH−MSR = 4 · τ3 = 4 · ⌊(15 − 6)/2⌋ = 16, which is larger than τRS−MSR = ⌊(60 − 36)/2⌋ = 12.
We also show that the maximum number of malicious nodes from which the errors can be corrected
by the H-MSR code in Fig. 2. Here the parameter q of the Hermitian code increases from 4 to 16 with
a step of 2. In the figure, the code rates for the RS-MSR code and the H-MSR code are the same. The
figure demonstrates that for data regeneration, the H-MSR code has better error correction capability than
the RS-MSR code.
For data reconstruction described in Algorithm 7, according to Theorem 5 and equation (58), the
number of errors that H-MSR code can correct is τH−MSR = q · ⌊(q2 − kq−1)/2⌋. Similarly, we can
conclude that for data reconstruction the H-MSR code has better error correction capability than the
RS-MSR code under the same code rate.
C. Complexity Discussion
For the complexity of the H-MSR code, we consider two scenarios.
1) H-MSR regeneration: For the H-MSR regeneration, compared with RS-MSR code, the H-MSR code
will slightly increase the complexity of the helper nodes. For each helper node, the extra operation is a
matrix multiplication between B−1i and Yi. The complexity is O(q2) = O((n1/3)2) = O(n2/3). Similar
to [13], for a replacement node, from Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3, we can derive that the complexity to
regenerate symbols for RS-MSR is O(n2), while the complexity for H-MSR is only O(n5/3). Likewise,
for Algorithm 4, the complexity to recover the H-MSR code is O(n5/3), and O(n2) for RS-MSR code.
2) H-MSR reconstruction: For the reconstruction, compared with RS-MSR code, the additional com-
plexity of the H-MSR code for each storage node is O(q2), which is O(n2/3). The computational
complexity for DC to reconstruct the data is O(n5/3) for the H-MSR code and O(n2) for the RS-MSR
code.
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Fig. 2. Comparison of error correction capability between the H-MSR code and the RS-MSR code
XI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a Hermitian code based minimum storage regeneration (H-MSR) code
and a Hermitian code based minimum bandwidth regeneration (H-MBR) code for distributed storage.
Due to the structure of Hermitian code, our proposed codes can significantly improve the performance of
the regenerating code under malicious attacks. In particular, these codes can deal with errors beyond the
maximum distance separable (MDS) code. Our theoretical analyses demonstrate that the H-MSR/H-MBR
codes have lower complexity than the Reed-Solomon based minimum storage regeneration (RS-MSR)
code and the Reed-Solomon based minimum bandwidth regeneration (RS-MBR) code in both regeneration
and reconstruction. As a future research task, we will further analyze the optimal design of regenerating
code based on the Hermitian-like codes.
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